SSO authentication: a new approach

[Guy Rixon]

Roy,

what happens when all service providers require local registration? Doesn't it
get a bit tricky for hte end users?


Guy

On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Roy Williams wrote:

> Ray's "weak certificate" does not prove who the person is in a real-world context, but
> only for example that the reader of data be the same as the writer.
>
> In my "HotGrid", (*) I would extract a description of what they are doing and who they are
> through simple registration -- in exchange for a *quantitative* increase in some sort of
> limit -- a limit that is more stringent for anonymous users.
>
> The OpenSkyNode.net at Baltimore truncates SQL queries at 5,000 and all users are
> anonymous. Perhaps they would allow 50,000 for those who have registered.
>
> This kind of information about usage looks fabulous in an Annual Report.
>
> Roy
>
> (*) http://us-vo.org/pubs/files/hotgrid.pdf
>
> --------
> California Institute of Technology
> roy at caltech.edu
> 626 395 3670
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "John Good" <jcg at ipac.caltech.edu>
> To: "Ray Plante" <rplante at ncsa.uiuc.edu>
> Cc: <grid at ivoa.net>
> Sent: Monday, March 14, 2005 3:59 PM
> Subject: Re: SSO authentication: a new approach
>
>
> >
> > Ray -
> >
> > I can't see that I would be willing to let
> > someone with one of your "weak certificates"
> > do much more than someone with an HTTP cookie.
> > I would not, for instance, let them have file
> > upload access (unless I wanted to be in the
> > business of supplying free storage to the
> > world).
> >
> > - John
> >
> >
> > Ray Plante wrote:
> >
> >> Hey Paul,
> >>
> >> On Fri, 11 Mar 2005, Paul Harrison wrote:
> >>
> >>>In the discussion so far of  "less-trusted" or "weak certificates" - what is actually
> >>>meant is lower priviledges assigned to an identity that is still confirmed by reference
> >>>to a CA signature, in just the same way that a "strong certificate" - i.e. as far as
> >>>the cryptographic confirmation of the identity goes there is no difference.
> >>
> >>
> >> In my view of the idea of "weak certificates" is not simply an issue of lower
> >> priviledges.  Consider your definition...
> >>
> >>
> >>>I still think that we should distinguish between trust (i.e. do we know that the entity
> >>>is what it says it is - i.e. it has identity signed by a certificate authority that we
> >>>know) ...
> >>
> >>
> >> With a weak certificate, we *don't* know that the entity is what it says
> >> it is.  We only know that the entity is the same entity as the last time
> >> it came around.  The point is that with a Weak CA, we cannot put full
> >> trust in it because it is easy for users to register false identities.
> >>
> >> I sense that an underlying principle that you are trying to get at is that
> >> authentication and determining authorization are separate operations.
> >> If so, I agree whole-heartedly.  In the case of weak certificates, the
> >> CA that signs the cert can be used in part to assign priviledges.  cheers,
> >> Ray
> >
>

Guy Rixon 				        gtr at ast.cam.ac.uk
Institute of Astronomy   	                Tel: +44-1223-337542
Madingley Road, Cambridge, UK, CB3 0HA		Fax: +44-1223-337523